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A NOTE TO STATES DEFENDING HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: EXAMINING VIABLE ARGUMENTS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
MATTHEW C. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian Intervention (HI) has been a central topic of
controversy within international law scholarship for many years. This
controversy is unsurprising because HI inevitably pits several of the
most fundamental international norms as opposing forces: state
sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force versus the duty of
states to prevent human rights atrocities and protect human life. HI
takes many forms, but it is best defined as intervention into the
sovereign territory of another state, without the host state's consent, for
the purpose of halting atrocity crimes, such as genocide, ethnic
cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.' It is conducted in
one of two ways, with Security Council (SC) authorization or without
such authorization. 2 In either case, HI categorically conflicts with
notions of state sovereignty, and, in most instances, the prohibition on
the use of force. Despite such conflict, HI through the SC has been
universally accepted.3 "Unauthorized" HI, on the other hand, has been
* Matthew Cooper, JD '09, University of Denver Sturm of College of Law; LL.M.,
International Law and International Relations, University of Kent (Brussels School of
International Studies). Cooper has served as clerk for the U.N. International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and as a trial attorney for the United States Department of Labor.
He currently practices employment law in Colorado, with a particular focus on mining
and workplace safety. He wishes to extend special gratitude to Professor Ved Nanda, to
whom this book is dedicated, for his past and continued mentorship in the dynamic field
of international law.
1. E.g., Robert 0. Keohane, Introduction, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 1, 1 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds.,
2003) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION]; J.L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian
Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra, at 15, 18; SIMON
CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules?
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 177, 181-82.
3. See Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Lessons
of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 858 (1999).
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more controversial. The primary question addressed herein is whether
states would have a good faith means to justify HI if one day brought
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The central concentration with regard to this question is on the
evolution of HI within customary international law. This subject is not
new, and since the inception of the UN Charter (hereinafter the
Charter) numerous authors have examined the component parts of
custom (state practice and opinio juris) with regard to HI. 4 This
process has revealed many different approaches to this perplexing
problem, as well as a myriad of conclusions. This study differs
primarily in method, as it is written with a focus on the practical
application of the HI doctrine and viable good-faith arguments for
states before the ICJ. This study also differs by demonstrating the
importance of evaluating opinio juris in a contemporaneous fashion. In
other words, through historical analysis of several humanitarian
interventions, this study illustrates that when investigating custom it is
much more telling to assess the statements and actions (or inactions) of
states at the time an intervention is taking place. Subsequent
diplomatic statements cannot be ignored, but undue weight should not
be given to statements most likely aimed at discouraging abuse of this
potentially dangerous doctrine and not the doctrine itself. Doing so is
the only viable means of truly understanding whether the international
community believes an intervening state should be exonerated for
undertaking a true humanitarian intervention. Through such an
approach, it is possible to discern an acceptance by states that
unauthorized HI is lawful (or at least legally justified) in extreme
circumstances, when truly taken for humanitarian reasons and when
conducted proportionately to that purpose.
Existing in conspicuous parallel with HI is the newly emerged
"Responsibility to Protect" doctrine (R2P).5 While HI and R2P are
intertwined, it is erroneous to refer to the doctrines interchangeably.
HI deals with a "right" of states to intervene in the affairs of other
states, whereas R2P deals with the "responsibility," and perhaps even a
4. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures
and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 791 passim (1999); Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F.
Muther, Jr. & Amy E. Eckert, Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and
Liberia - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law -
Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827, 827-28 (1998); A.P.V. Rogers, Humanitarian
Intervention and International Law, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 725, 726 (2004).
5. S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); 2005 World Summit
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter World
Summit]; INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter R2P]; Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 203, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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legal duty, to prevent "atrocity crimes."6 Notably, R2P primarily places
the onus of protection on the state in which atrocities are occurring, 7
and only secondarily upon the international community.8 However, the
2005 World Summit Outcome clearly articulates that the international
community, including each Member State of the United Nations (UN),
also has some form of responsibility for crimes of mass atrocity, even
when occurring outside their own state borders. 9 While R2P's contours
are still evolving, its unanimous adoption by the General Assembly
(GA) has solidified the doctrine somewhere in international law.10
While the predominant focus herein is on the legal "rights" of states to
respond to atrocity crimes and not their "responsibility" to do so, this
study will conclude by evaluating the potential interplay between the
two doctrines in front of the ICJ.
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ALLOWS FOR HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
The Charter is the necessary starting point when analyzing
whether HI is lawful, and for that matter, whether it is even possible
for such a doctrine to arise through customary law alongside the
Charter. Although HI is admittedly nowhere to be found within the
Charter, it is well accepted that customary law and the Charter can
exist in parallel." However, some authors have rightly pointed out that
the Charter could preclude the possibility of a customary exception to
the prohibition on the use of force, even for strictly humanitarian
reasons, if the customary norm were inconsistent with the terms of the
Charter. 12
With regard to HI, the opponents' syllogism goes like this: the
Charter, in Article 2(4), specifically prohibits the threat or use of force
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations"; this prohibition is comprehensive, except for the explicit
exceptions articulated in the Charter, namely Security Council
authorization and Article 51 self-defense; and, therefore, even if HI
6. See, e.g., World Summit, supra note 5, 11 138-39; David Scheffer, Prevention:
Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 111, 111
(2008) (designating genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
as "atrocity crimes" for the purpose of accuracy and simplicity in communication).




11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 178-79 (June 27); see North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.;
F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, IT 71-73 (Feb. 20); Asylum (Colom./Peru). 1950 I.C.J. 266,
276 (Nov. 20).
12. E.g., MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 100 (2005).
2012 169
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
arose through the component elements of custom (state practice and
opinio juris), HI would still be a violation of international law because it
would violate the superior and affirmative obligations under the
Charter.' 3 In its essence, the argument is based on principles of lex
specialis, and also grounded in the provisions of Article 103 of the
Charter, which affirms that the Charter prevails over all inconsistent
norms. 14
This is an admittedly compelling argument. Indeed, if the
prohibition on the use of force were absolute, apart from the Charter's
explicit exceptions, then Article 103 would bar a customary norm from
overriding its terms, unless of course it rose to the level of jus cogens (a
status HI has clearly not achieved).15 This recognition is extremely
important, but many proponents of HI have regrettably overlooked it.
Nevertheless, there is an answer to this sound argument, and it rests in
the fundamental principles of treaty interpretation, as articulated in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT),16 which are also considered to be custom.' 7
The reason states have recourse to these principles lies in the
ambiguity of the terms of Article 2(4).18 Some argue the language
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations" is not ambiguous, and that the provision is a comprehensive
ban on force.19 However, the inability of both states and international
jurists to come to agreement over the Article's full extent lends credible
evidence to the contrary. 20  Consequently, recourse to principles of
13. See id. at 99-100.
14. U.N. Charter art. 103.
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
16. Id. arts. 31-32.
17. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 1 160 (Feb. 26); Legal
Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 1 94 (July 9); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 83 (Mar. 31); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 99 (June
27).
18. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31.
19. E.g., Bruno Simma, NATO, The U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1999).
20. Compare, e.g., Nanda et al., supra note 4, at 864-65 (arguing that individual
states should be allowed to intervene when international organizations cannot), and
FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 6 (3d ed. 2005) (arguing that states may intervene to prevent "severe tyranny
or anarchy" in other states), with W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: NATO's
Kosovo Intervention, Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 861-62 (1999) (arguing
that the general prohibition on the use of force should be read narrowly), and Simma,
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treaty interpretation is necessary to resolve the contours of Article 2(4)
and to determine if HI is absolutely prohibited. Doing so provides
insight into the modern meaning of the provision as well as the
underlying purposes of the UN Charter.
VCLT Article 31 mandates three primary means of
interpretation. 2 1  The first requires "good faith" interpretation in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms "in their context
and in the light of [the treaty's] object and purpose." 22 The second calls
for examination of the context surrounding the treaty, including the
preamble and annexes, any agreement relating to the treaty's
conclusion, and any instrument made in connection with the conclusion
of the treaty. 23 The third, which is of utmost importance here, entails
examination of "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation," as well as any relevant rules of international law. 2 4 It
bears explicit mention that all steps are required; none is mutually
exclusive to the others. 25
With regard to the first step, there are good faith arguments on
both sides. Opponents of HI can legitimately argue that the Charter
was put in place in the wake of WWII to prevent states from abusing
their power and invading the sovereignty of others - abuse that during
WWII led to the most horrendous atrocities the world had ever seen.
Specifically, it could be argued that the context of the Charter's
inception points to a full prohibition on the use of force, except when
authorized by the Security Council, for the very purpose of preventing
such abuse. 26 Likewise, the very first words of Article 1(1) are "[t]o
maintain international peace and security," thereby indicating the
primary importance of respecting state sovereignty and refraining from
using force against other states.27 Going a step further, opponents
could even argue, in good faith, that the principles regarding respect for
human rights are subsidiary to this fundamental purpose. 28
On the other hand, proponents of HI can point to the second part of
UN Charter Article 1(1), which envisions "effective collective measures"
supra note 19, at 2-3 (stating that Article 2(4) is meant to be "of a comprehensive
nature").
21. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31.
22. Id. art. 31, para. 1.
23. Id. art. 31, para. 2.
24. Id. art. 31, para. 3 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Petr Valek, Note, Is Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Compatible
with the U.N. Charter?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1223, 1240-41 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 19, at 3.
27. U.N. Charter art. 1, para 1 (emphasis added).
28. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 24 (1999).
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to respond to threats to the peace, 29 Article 1(3), which highlights the
need "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems, and in promoting respect for human rights," 30 as well as
Article 55, which recognizes that conditions of stability, which includes
universal observance of human rights, "are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations."31 Moreover, proponents of HI can
certainly argue, likewise in good faith, that the very same purpose that
underlies the rationale for both non-use of force and HI are one in the
same - the protection of human life. Therefore, though collective
forceful measures through the SC may have been the ideal means
envisioned for protecting human life at the time the Charter was
formed, once the mechanism breaks down (i.e., because of a P532 veto),
the fundamental right to life itself is what is deserving of protection, not
the means for protecting the right.
In either case, a teleological approach to Article 2(4) does not fully
answer the question. To the contrary, it seems necessary to simply
accept that the Charter's object and purpose is two-fold - to maintain
international peace and security and to ensure protection for
fundamental human rights - both of which embody the most
fundamental of rights, the right to life.
Consequently, the next step is to turn to Article 31(3) of the VCLT,
namely paragraph (b), which mandates examination of "'subsequent
practice."33 Doing so allows examination of Member States' present
agreement to the Charter, which has come to be accepted as dispositive
with regard to a treaty's binding force (as opposed to the framers'
original intent).34 The ICJ has adopted this approach on multiple
occasions. In Namibia, for example, when examining Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Court explicitly stated, "an
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation." 3 5 Likewise, in Nicaragua the Court held that the
Charter "by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use
of force," specifically referring to the area of non-intervention as an
example, and proceeding to examine custom to qualify the terms of the
29. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
30. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
31. Id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
32. See id. art. 27.
33. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31, para. 3 (emphasis added).
34. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 439 (July 18)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup); Competence of General Assembly for Admission of
State into United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Mar. 3) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Alvarez).
35. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, T 53 (June 21).
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Charter. 36 Judge Alvarez similarly addressed the issue of Charter
interpretation in the Admissions Case, stating:
The text [of the Charter] must not be slavishly followed. If
necessary, it must be vivified so as to harmonize it with the new
conditions of international life. When the wording of a text
seems clear, that is not sufficient reason for following it
literally, without taking into account the consequences of its
application.37
As a result, to determine the true confines of Article 2(4),
subsequent practice must be examined. Therefore, whether a
customary norm has arisen, and whether Article 2(4) and the Charter
allow for HI are in fact two parts of the same inquiry. Thus, the
Charter does not absolutely prohibit a customary norm of HI.
Though unnecessary, the Court could also look to the preparatory
work, or travaux prdparatoires, of the San Francisco Conference to
reach the conclusion that Article 2(4) is not absolute. 38  At the
Conference, there was much discussion and debate as to what terms
should be included within Article 2(4). Many proposals were made and
rejected before settling on the current language. 39 Included among
them was a proposal put forth by Norway, by which the Norwegian
representative suggested including the language in Article 2(4) - "not
approved by the Security Council as a means of implementing the
purposes of the Organization" - to unambiguously affirm that only the
Council could authorize force under Article 2(4).40 However, after much
consideration, including discussion that the inclusion of the language -
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
member state" - would leave ambiguity, the drafting committee chose
to reject the specific language, instead adopting the existing open-ended
terminology. 41 This suggests that states were conscious of the evolving
nature of international law, and that they allowed for this reality.
Thus, as former ICJ President Rosalynn Higgins has averred, Article
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 176 (June 27).
37. Admission of State, 1950 I.C.J. at 17.
38. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 32; Application of Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43,
T 160 (Feb. 26).
39. BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A FRESH LEGAL
APPROACH BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD RELIGIONS 345-47 (2002).
40. Id. at 346.
41. Id. at 346-47.
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2(4) and the prohibition on the use of force should be treated as evolving
norms.42 Doing so allows for customary HI.
SECURITY COUNCIL INTERVENTION HAS CHANGED THE CONTOURS OF
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Security Council-authorized HI perfectly exemplifies the evolution
President Higgins referenced. Though now accepted as lawful, the
legality of SC-authorized HI was also once controversial. 4 3 The reason
for this stems from Article 2(7) of the Charter, notions of inviolable
state sovereignty, as well as the explicit limits laid out in the Charter
regarding the SC's ability to use force only in situations where
"necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."44
While these concepts have not been outmoded, their parameters are in
continual evolution and have undergone significant modification in the
past 54 years. This is seen through the actions of the SC, the
pronouncements of the ICJ, the international reaction to SC
intervention, and most recently with the unanimous adoption of the
2005 World Summit Outcome document by the General Assembly. 45
Each is examined below.
State sovereignty has always taken center stage in international
law, and was explicitly recognized in Article 2(7) of the Charter, which
states: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . ."46 For a long time, so-called
human rights affairs were considered to fall under this provision, and
the SC refrained from acting, no matter how egregious states' human
rights violations were. 47 However, beginning with the close of the Cold
War, the SC found new life and began to act, under Article 42 of
Chapter VII of the Charter, to intervene in situations of extreme human
42. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 167-222 (1963) referenced in Jost E.
ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 185 (2005).
43. See, e.g., Mohammed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and International
Society, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 225 (2001). Ayoob argues that human rights abuses and
internal conflicts are domestic matters and that they therefore do not fall under Chapter
VII and should not even be considered by the Security Council. It must be noted,
however, that Ayoob is arguing that human rights abuses and internal conflicts should be
considered "removed from the purview of Chapter VII," not that state practice has shown
otherwise. Id. at 228.
44. U.N. Charter art. 42 (emphasis added).
45. World Summit, supra note 5, IT 138-39, 152.
46. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
47. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment: NATO's Kosovo
Intervention, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834,
835, 838 (1999).
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suffering, even when contained within one state's borders. 48 Such
interventions include Somalia (1991), Haiti (1993-94), Rwanda (1994),
East Timor (1999), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), among others, and
they represent a chapter in international law that gave hope to many
that the UN system was beginning to work as originally envisioned -
for security and the protection of human life.
To find proper authority for such SC authorized humanitarian
interventions does not take much creativity. Clearly the SC has
primary responsibility for international peace and security. 49 It also
has the authority to authorize force in situations that threaten such
peace and security.50 In turning to both Article 55 of the Charter,51 as
well as the direct effects of atrocity crimes, such as massive refugee
flows, strained international relations, the potential for civil and
regional war, the strain on international economic relations, and the
mere fact that such crimes shock the conscience of mankind, 52 it iS well
accepted that the SC has the prerogative to determine whether
situations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
are indeed "threats to international peace and security" and thereby
take action to abate the threat or breach if it indeed exists. 53 This led
states to explicitly accept SC intervention for human rights purposes.
The primary importance of this development is the recognition that
situations of mass atrocity are no longer solely domestic matters
shielded behind the guise of territorial sovereignty. 54 Instead, as the
48. See Cassese, supra note 28, at 26.
49. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1; Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/377, at 10 (Nov. 3, 1950); Certain Expenses of United Nations: Article 17,
Paragraph 2, of Charter, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 165-68 (July 20).
50. U.N. Charter art. 42.
51. Article 55 recognizes that the preservation of human rights is a necessary
condition for the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 55.
52. See, e.g., R2P, supra note 5, 4.13, at 31 (recognizing there must be limitations to
the non-intervention rule for exceptional circumstances).
53. See, e.g., World Summit, supra note 5, 139; MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE
POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF ENFORCEMENT 223 (2008); Olivier Corten, Human Rights and Collective Security: Is
There an Emerging Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 95 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008);
Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention:
An Emerging Legal Norm?, 10 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 37 (1999-2000); Simma,
supra note 19, at 5; Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 323, 337-38 (1996).
54. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 169 (2000), [hereinafter ICOK]
(referencing the statements of former Secretaries General Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi Annan); Amy Eckert, The Non-Intervention Principle and
Humanitarian Interventions, 7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 48, 52 (2001); Richard Falk, Legality
to Legitimacy: The Revival of the Just War Framework, HARV. INT'L REV. (2006), available
at http://hir.harvard.edulprint/interventionismilegality-to-legitimacy.
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ICJ has now recognized on multiple occasions, atrocity crimes inhere a
legal interest in their protection for all states.56 In addition to SC
action itself, this view is further demonstrated by the response of the
international community, which has either openly praised the SC or
refrained from condemning its actions. In the most pronounced
showing of international support for such action, the General Assembly
unanimously adopted the World Summit Outcome in 2005, which
contained explicit provisions accepting the "Responsibility to Protect"
beleaguered populations, and if necessary, the willingness to act
forcefully through the SC under Chapter VII.56 Such a showing of
unanimous international solidarity is unusual in international
relations, and it speaks loudly to states' concerns with preventing
atrocity crimes. More importantly, it speaks to the position of the
international community that two types of action are unequivocally
lawful: (1) non-forceful measures aimed at the perpetrators of atrocity
crimes, whether authorized or not; and (2) forceful measures taken
through the SC. In sum, the SC has changed the debate regarding
humanitarian intervention, and issues of sovereignty have been
virtually removed from the discussion. 57
THE USE OF FORCE AND EVOLUTION OF "INDEPENDENT" HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Conceptions of "sovereignty" no longer preclude humanitarian
intervention.5 8 However, because the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use
of force still stands, the next question to be answered is what recourse
does the international community have when non-forceful measures do
not sufficiently counteract atrocity crimes and when the SC is either
unwilling or unable to take action. In other words, is humanitarian
intervention without SC authorization ever lawful? Or, in the
alternative, is it ever justified by "necessity" so that the wrongfulness of
a state's action would be precluded before a court of law such as the
ICJ?
55. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 155 (July 9); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33-34 (Feb. 5); Reservations to
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951
I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
56. World Summit, supra note 5, T 139.
57, See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 2 (supporting this outcome by mandating that all
Member States fulfill their Charter obligations in good faith in order to be ensured the
rights and benefits resulting from membership).
58. Eckert, supra note 54, at 50, 52 (pointing out that sovereignty is now viewed as
entailing not only rights, but responsibilities, and when states fail those responsibilities,
they forfeit a part of their sovereignty).
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The question of HI's legality has been addressed many times, with
varying conclusions. 59  Many scholars still maintain that HI is
absolutely forbidden under international law, while others forcefully
argue that a right to HI has emerged under customary international
law. Most interestingly, a number of scholars posit that HI is not yet
lawful, but perhaps "justified."60 The latter is a seemingly sound
position, but this approach has not fully addressed the true real-world
consequences of such a determination. If justified, does that mean legal
liability would still arise if a country were brought before the ICJ and
found to have acted in accordance with the HI doctrine? 61 Or does it
suggest some form of estoppel or necessity doctrine, as adopted by the
ICJ in the Gabjikovo-Nagymaros Project,62 which would preclude state
wrongfulness? The actions of states speak loudly to this query and
evidence an acceptance by states that, in certain extreme and limited
circumstances, intervening states should not be condemned or held
legally liable for their humanitarian actions. This evidence is outlined
below.
Note: For the purpose of this analysis, humanitarian intervention
taken without SC authorization, but supported by the international
community (or at least not widely condemned), will be termed
"independent" humanitarian intervention. This designation
intentionally avoids using the term "unilateral" intervention because
unilateral intervention connotes intervention by a single state or small
group of states with little international support. However, there is little
evidence that HI without widespread international support would ever
be justified. Thus, the two must be distinguished and it should be clear
that the conclusions reached regarding arguments available to
59. See, e.g., SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS &
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 26 (2005); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 710-12 (6th ed. 2003); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 2, at 177;
CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 219; Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the
Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at
204-05; LEPARD, supra note 39, at 336; FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 3 (3d. ed. 2005); Christopher
Greenwood, International Law and NATO Intervention in Kosovo, Memorandum
Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, reprinted in 49
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 926, 926 (2000).
60. E.g., Cassese, supra note 28, at 25 (stating that "from an ethical viewpoint resort
to armed force was justified. Nevertheless, as legal scholar I cannot avoid observing in
the same breath that this moral action is contrary to current international law."); Franck,
supra note 59, at 226 (arguing "the unlawfulness of [humanitarian intervention] was
mitigated, to the point of exoneration," because the circumstances were brutally
calamitous).
61. For details of what elements must be fulfilled to fall within the doctrine, see infra
Part 5.
62. Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 51 (Sept. 25).
2012 177
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
intervening states are only with regard to "independent" humanitarian
intervention.
The General Assembly and Uniting for Peace: The Often-
Overlooked Origins of Independent Humanitarian
Intervention
The international community collectively addressed the often
underappreciated possibility of inaction on the part of the Security
Council as early as 1950.63 Faced with SC inaction in response to
Russian Vetoes during the Korean War, the General Assembly passed
resolution 377 (V), more commonly referred to as "Uniting for Peace."64
The resolution states that should the SC, because of lack of unanimity
of the permanent members, fail to exercise its primary responsibility to
maintain international peace and security, then states, upon
"recommendation" of the GA, may resort to "armed force when
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."65
To ensure that the Resolution would have effect, the GA created the
"emergency special session" (ESS) to ensure prompt action in the face of
a SC stall. 6 6 Accordingly, an ESS can be called within 24 hours in one
of two ways, either (1) at the request of the GA upon a two-thirds
majority vote, or (2) on the basis of a procedural vote in the SC, which
cannot be blocked by a P5 veto. 67
The Resolution can be viewed as the beginning of independent
humanitarian intervention in the modern era for several reasons. First,
the resolution was passed with a vote of 52 to 5, with two abstentions,
which indicates wide international support.68 Additionally, Uniting for
Peace has been invoked ten times since its inception, 69 and in at least
two instances, first in the Suez Canal and then in Namibia, the GA did
in fact call upon states to render military assistance. 70 The response of
the ICJ in both the Wall Opinion and Certain Expenses affirmed the
legality of these "peacekeeping" operations under the authorization of
the GA, and indirectly, of the underlying Uniting for Peace Resolution.71
63. See Uniting for Peace, supra note 49, at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. 1 1.
66. Emergency Special Sessions, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
www.un.org/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml [hereinafter ESS] (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
67. Uniting for Peace, supra note 49, Annex 1.
68. Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace: General Assembly Resolution 377(V),
Procedural History, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org/codlavlhalufp/ufp.html.
69. ESS, supra note 66.
70. G.A. Res. ES-8/2, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-8/2 (Sept. 11, 1981); GA. Res. 1000
(ES-I), 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1000 (Nov. 5,1956).
71. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 28 (July 9); Certain Expenses of United Nations:
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Moreover, the ICJ has explicitly found that a series of GA resolutions
such as those following Uniting for Peace "may show the gradual
evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new
rule,"72 and that opinio juris may be deduced by carefully examining the
"attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions . . .
."3 Because Uniting for Peace allowed for force without going through
the SC, manifest evidence indicates a shift away from a SC monopoly on
the use of force as early as 1950.
All in all, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, its subsequent
implementation, and the response of the international community
illustrates widespread state support for the position that the SC is
neither solely responsible for maintaining peace and security nor does it
hold a monopoly on the use of force.74 More importantly, it affirms that
states will be justified, in limited circumstances, in acting without SC
authorization. In short, Uniting for Peace provides an alternative to the
SC when peace and security is threatened, and proclaims that
authorization is not always necessary for states to be justified in the use
of force.
INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CASE STUDIES
Uniting for Peace confirms that the Security Council is not the only
means to address atrocity situations. However, the Resolution could
conceivably work against proponents of independent HI, as it is yet
another mechanism available (arguably through the Charter) to those
states willing to intervene in situations of mass atrocity. In other
words, to have their actions legitimized, states should request a vote
through the GA to act through Uniting for Peace before taking matters
into their own hands. In fact, it could feasibly be argued that if a state
could not attain the two-thirds required support of the GA, then it is not
justified in taking independent action anyway. Uniting for Peace also
seems to answer questions of urgency, as an ESS can be convened
within 24 hours.75 This scenario presents a compelling argument:
because proponents point to the P5 veto as the predominant change in
circumstance justifying HI, and because the international community
has already addressed situations of veto deadlock by allowing Uniting
Article 17, Paragraph 2, of Charter, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 165-68 (July 20);
ALVAREZ, supra note 42, at 126.
72. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
70-71 (July 8); see also Wall, 2004 I.C.J., 3 (separate opinion of Judge Al-
Khasawneh) ("[Rlesolutions ... while not binding, nevertheless produce legal effects and
indicate a constant record of the international community's opinio juris.").
73. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 188 (June 27).
74. Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 165-68; Uniting for Peace, supra note 49.
75. ESS, supra note 66.
1792012
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
for Peace actions, states must attempt to go through the GA in order to
claim independent HI is justifiable.
While utilizing Uniting for Peace might be desirable, this argument
is not fully persuasive for two reasons. First, even if Uniting for Peace
provides an alternative mechanism, the GA is not "authorizing" force
per se, as only the SC has the power to do. Instead, it is merely
recognizing an independent means for states to act - with international
support. Therefore, there is no legal requirement that the GA
"authorize" forceful HI. Second, state practice indicates that such a
process is not necessary in the face of atrocity crimes. Proponents of
independent HI point to a variety of interventions to support
independent HI, none of which utilized Uniting for Peace, but which
nonetheless lead these distinguished publicists to conclude that HI is
lawful. 76 Some attention is given, for example, to interventions
undertaken in the 1970s by India into East Pakistan, Vietnam into
Cambodia, and Tanzania into Uganda.77  Others also mention
intervention by Belgium into the Congo in the 1960s,78 Syria's Invasion
of Lebanon in 1976,79 France's invasion into the Central African
Republic in 1979,80 as well as India's invasion of Sri Lanka in 1987.81
Admittedly, it is difficult to maintain that these interventions in
themselves led to a custom of HI, primarily due to the concomitant (and
primary) reliance of the intervening states on claims of self-defense for
legal justification. 82 Nonetheless, they represent a development by
which states began to recognize that intervention for humanitarian
motives might deserve a place in modern international law. More
importantly, states began to justify their actions based on HI in a way
that resembled opinio juris, even if not yet explicitly doing so by
claiming "legality" through HI.
Moving to the 1990s, however, a discernible trend became
apparent: for the first time, states began to intervene solely upon
humanitarian justifications, and they began to do so with the explicit
76. E.g., TESON, supra note 59, at 418; Charney, supra note 47, at 838; Greenwood,
supra note 59, at 931; Nanda et al., supra note 4, at 862; Reisman, supra note 20, at 860;
Rogers, supra note 4, at 732.
77. BREAU, supra note 59, at 33-34; TESON, supra note 20, at 207-08; NICHOLAS J.
WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
2 (2000); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 203, 204 (1973-1974).
78. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 84, 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part II) [herein-
after DASR].
79. BREAU, supra note 59, at 33.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 1, 73, 79, 117.
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support of regional organizations. Four such interventions dominate
the discussion. First, in 1992, the U.S., U.K., and Coalition forces
intervened in Iraq, without SC authorization, to maintain no-fly zones
over parts of both northern and southern Iraq to protect the Kurdish
and Shi'i populations, respectively. Second, the East African
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) engaged in two
humanitarian interventions, one into Liberia beginning in the early
1990s and then into Sierra Leone towards the end of the same decade.
Again, in neither situation did the SC authorize intervention prior to
ECOWAS's use of forceful measures. Finally, the most conspicuous and
highly scrutinized HI is, of course, the unauthorized intervention by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces into Kosovo and
surrounding regions in 1999.
This brings this study to the heart of the matter - whether there
exists sufficient evidence of the two component parts of customary
international law to conclude that HI is acceptable under modern
international law.8 3  Necessarily, this analysis begins with the
"individual" actions and statements of states, but is more fully analyzed
by also examining the "collective" actions and statements of states
through a diverse array of international organizations. The case
studies below provide for such a process.
Iraq 1991-1992
In the wake of "Operation Desert Storm," members of the
international community again invaded Iraq, this time without explicit
SC authorization, to establish no-fly zones aimed at protecting Kurdish
groups in the north and Shi'i groups in the south.84 Both groups had
faced decades of persecution and gross human rights violations under
the reign of Saddam Hussein.85  In the late 1980s, for example,
chemical weapons were used to target the Kurdish population, leading
Human Rights Watch to conclude that the acts amounted to genocide.86
Approximately 182,000 Kurds were murdered during this period, and
some equated the action with the Nazi campaign against the Jews.87
Despite the destruction of nearly 5,000 Kurdish villages and the
83. For further background on the interventions addressed herein, Professor Susan
Breau presents a very comprehensive and well-written review on the factual background
of each intervention. BREAU, supra note 59, at 33-147.
84. Id. at 87.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 88; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE: THE
ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS 17-19 (1995).
87. BREAU, supra note 59, at 89; SHERI LAIZER, MARTYRS, TRAITORS AND PATRIOTS:
KURDISTAN AFTER THE GULF WAR 2 (1996); see also, e.g., SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM
FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 172, 203 (2002).
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displacement of countless individuals,88 the remaining Kurds staged a
meager rebellion in March 1991.89 Hussein again went on the offensive,
targeting Kurd civilians with napalm and brutal targeted bombing
campaigns. By early May, over one million refugees had fled to Iran
and nearly 500,000 to Turkey. 90 Simultaneously, the Shi'i Muslim
population in the south of Iraq was also subjected to gross
mistreatment. Though differing in extent, with no indications of
genocidal intent, the Shi'i were denied basic rights, expelled to
neighboring countries, and subjected to artillery attacks.91 By early
1991, both conflicts undoubtedly involved extensive atrocity crimes and
the clear targeting of distinct ethnic groups.
In April 1991, several countries wrote letters to the SC asking for a
SC meeting to designate the situation in Iraq "a threat to international
peace and security."92 After extensive international pressure, the SC
finally passed Resolution 688, which "demand[ed] that Iraq, as a
contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security
in the region, immediately end this repression . . . ."93 In doing so,
however, Resolution 688 was not passed under Chapter VII, nor did it
set up safe havens or no-fly zones. 94 China and Russian veto threats
prevented any UN-authorized forceful action.
The lack of SC authorization did not prevent forceful humanitarian
intervention, however. On April 17, 1991, "Operation Provide Comfort"
was implemented under the leadership of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France,95 with substantial support from Germany, Italy,
88. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 257-60 (1989), reprinted in IRAQ AND
KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 650-51 (Marc Weller ed., 1993).
89. BREAU, supra note 59, at 89.
90. MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS OF IRAQ: TRAGEDY AND HOPE 52-54 (1992); see
also Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Iraq, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/31 (Feb. 18,
1992) (by Max Van der Stoel) (providing a full report on the situation).
91. Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Letter dated July 29, 1992
from the Special Rapporteur addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq,
reprinted in Charges D'Affaires A.I., Letter dated 3 Aug. 1992 from the Charge D'Affaires
A.I of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the U.N. addressed to the President of the
Security Council, 12-13, U.N. Doc. S/24386 (Aug. 5, 1992); see also BREAU, supra note 59,
at 92.
92. Permanent Rep. of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated Apr. 2, 1991 from the
Permanent Rep. of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/22435 (Apr. 3, 1991); Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of France, Letter
dated Apr. 4, 1991 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of France
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22442 (Apr. 4, 1991);
Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the U.N., Letter dated Apr. 4, 1991
from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/22447 (Apr. 4, 1991).
93. S.C. Res. 688, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (emphasis added).
94. See id.
95. BREAU, supra note 59, at 95.
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and the Netherlands. 96 A large northern area of Iraq was officially
declared a "no-fly" zone, and safe havens were provided for the
beleaguered Kurdish populations.97 Threats of forceful action kept
Iraqi forces from entering the predominately Kurdish areas. The
second phase of the intervention, which mirrored the first, began in
southern Iraq in August 1992. Despite GA condemnation of Iraq's
human rights abuses, there was no SC authorization in either
situation. 98 The no-fly zones in both regions continued until 2003.
The primary justification for the unauthorized intervention was
humanitarian necessity. 99 Coalition forces explicitly proclaimed that
they were "operat[ing] under international law . . . [which] recognizes
extreme humanitarian need." 00 The intervening states concurrently
relied upon Resolution 688, claiming "a rubric exists within 688 to avoid
need for a separate resolution" 01 and that the action was "consistent
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688."102 However, to
clarify, the acting states did not claim that their action was authorized
per se. Instead, they argued that the circumstances in Iraq, which
amounted to a humanitarian disaster, justified their actions despite a
lack of explicit SC authorization. Notably, the states made explicit
claims that their actions were not only justified, but lawful. As a result,
Operation Provide Comfort was carried out with an opinio juris placing
independent humanitarian intervention within the realm of customary
law.
In response to the humanitarian intervention, the world responded
with tacit approval. The UN Secretary-General celebrated that the
principle of non-intervention "cannot be regarded as a protective barrier
behind which human rights could be massively or systematically
violated with impunity .. ."10 Likewise, the SC did not even consider
any resolution in opposition to the no-fly zones and safe havens;104 and
in a debate before the GA in 1992 to consider the human rights
96. KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 38127 (Vol. 37, Apr. 1991).
97. Id.; BREAU, supra note 59, at 95.
98. See G.A. Res. 47/145, U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/145 (Dec. 18, 1992).
99. BREAU, supra note 59, at 97.
100. Id. at 98 (quoting Douglas Hurd's response to a question on the "Today" Program
regarding lack of a United Nations resolution authorizing action); see also Geoffrey
Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1992, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
615, 826-27 (1992).
101. Statement by the UK Prime Minister: A Safe Haven for the Kurds, U.K. Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Press Office (Apr. 8, 1991), noted in NEIL FENTON,
UNDERSTANDING THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: COERCION OR CONSENT? 47-48 (2004).
102. BREAU, supra note 59, at 98 (quoting President Bush speaking during a press
conference on Apr. 16, 1991).
103. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, at 5 (U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (Sept. 13, 1991).
104. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3105th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3105 (Aug. 11, 1992).
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situation in Iraq, several states explicitly supported the intervention. 105
Admittedly, a number of states also argued that the intervention could
not be justified based on either a right to unilateral intervention or on
the basis of SC authorization. 106 Yet, when GA Resolution 47/145 was
passed, the resolution failed to mention the intervention or condemn
the actions of the Coalition Forces.1 07 In the end, states did not act to
condemn the actions of the intervening states, either legally or
politically.
Liberia 1990-1997
Corresponding with intervention in Iraq, human rights atrocities
were unfolding in West Africa that could no longer be ignored. After
years of civil strife and several failed coups, in late 1989 Charles Taylor
and his rebel troops (the NPFL) invaded across the Ivory Coast border
to challenge Liberian President Samuel Doe's power.108 A "campaign of
savage violence" immediately ensued, in which civilians became the
target of malicious reprisals by both sides.109 The devastation was so
great that it attracted widespread international attention, and both
sides were accused of "ethnic purging." 110 Massacres were frequent,
sexual violence was rampant, and torture was common, prompting
hundreds of thousands to flee in search of refuge in the neighboring
countries of Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone.111 Large-scale war
crimes and crimes against humanity were unmistakable.
In response, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) created a transnational peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to
intervene and protect the civilian population from the ongoing atrocity
crimes. 112 In similar fashion to the concurrent "no-fly zones" in Iraq,
the intervention was conducted in parallel to the United Nations and
the SC, but it was forcefully led by a regional organization without
gaining prior SC authorization. 11 3 From the beginning, ECOWAS took
105. BREAU, supra note 59, at 101-02.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see G.A. Res. 47/145, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/145 (Dec. 18, 1992); United Nations,
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, at 12-13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/71 (Feb.
18, 1992).
108. BREAU, supra note 59, at 75-76.
109. I.A. NASS, A STUDY IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS & THE WEST
AFRICAN PEACE INITIATIVE 60-61 (2000).
110. ICRC Report, Liberia: Terrible Human Tragedy, 1990, in REGIONAL PEACE-
KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 123-24 (M. Weller ed.,
1994); BREAU, supra note 59, at 76-77.
111. BREAU, supra note 59, at 76-77.
112. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 150 (1996).
113. See BREAU, supra note 59, at 78-83
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many steps to peacefully settle the conflict. 114 However, after peaceful
means failed, a "total peace plan was adopted."1 5 Part of the plan was
to provide ECOMOG with a mandate for armed intervention. 116
Again, the primary justification for intervention into Liberia was
humanitarian necessity, namely the need to protect human life and
address the threat to international peace and security.117  The
justification was made despite a marked absence of SC authorization to
use force. And in similar fashion to coalition forces in Iraq, ECOWAS's
belief that its action was legal was readily apparent. In 1978 ECOWAS
created a Protocol on Non-Aggression, which affirmed the members'
obligations to refrain from aggressive uses of force under Article 2(4) of
the Charter.118 Nevertheless, ECOWAS explicitly chose to use force
without SC authorization. Thus, ECOWAS's forceful actions in Liberia
and subsequent justifications provide evidence of not only a customary
norm of independent humanitarian intervention, but also reveal the
organization's belief that the Charter does not prohibit such action. In
other words, the members of ECOWAS concluded their humanitarian
actions were non-aggressive, in line with Article 2(4), and lawful. Once
more, the requisite opinio juris element to custom was manifest.
The tremendously positive international reaction buttressed
ECOWAS's position. The explicit support of the SC itself is most
notable. In November 1992, the SC passed resolution 788,119 which
primarily did three things: first, it imposed a complete embargo on all
deliveries of weapons to Liberia; second, it declared the situation to be a
"threat to international peace and security"; and, finally, it actually
endorsed and commended the unauthorized ECOWAS intervention.120
In the meetings to resolution 788, countries as diverse as the United
States, Russia, and China all commended the ECOWAS intervention
and its role in resolving the conflict. 121 Likewise, in 1991, the President
of the SC stated: "The members of the Security Council commend the
efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to
promote peace and normalcy in Liberia,"122 repeating these sentiments
114. MURPHY, supra note 112, at 149-50.
115. BREAU, supra note 59, at 79.
116. Id. at 79-80.
117. Comfort Ero, ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia, J.
HUMANITARIAN AsSISTANCE (Sept. 25, 1995), http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/66.
118. BREAU, supra note 59, at 78-79 (citing ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Agression, Apr.
22, 1978).
119. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992).
120. Id.; see also S.C. Res. 813, U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (Mar. 26, 1993).
121. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg. at 66, 71, 74-75, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3138 (Nov.
19, 1992).
122. U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991); see also BREAU, supra note 59, at 84.
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again in May 1992.123 In the words of Professor Breau, "the
international community as represented in the Security Council was
unanimous in this approval notwithstanding that there had not been
any type of enabling resolution by the United Nations." 12 4
Sierra Leone 1998
The crisis in Sierra Leone somewhat mirrored the disaster in
neighboring Liberia, leading to the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Sierra Leoneans (about one tenth of the population).1 25
Not only was the conflict in Sierra Leone similar to Liberia, but it also
had a direct link, as Charles Taylor had sent troops across the border
from Liberia in March 1991 in retaliation for Sierra Leone's provision of
an ECOMOG base in 1990.126 The Liberian NPFL joined forces with
the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary Patriotic Front (RUF), and the
groups set up a permanent headquarters in Sierra Leone. 1 2 7 This led to
protracted conflict between the existing government and several rebel
groups competing for power. Within 18 months of the conflict, at least
400,000 civilians had been displaced, 128 and in April the government
was overthrown. 129 The war continued, however, and attacks upon the
civilian population persisted. By late 1994, the RUF attacks had spread
to nearly all parts of the country.13 0
Throughout the conflict, numerous reports emerged documenting
the grave extent of the atrocities. The International Committee of the
Red Cross warned, for example, that something needed to be done to
stop the disaster from turning into another Rwanda. 131 The United
123. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3071st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3071 (May 7, 1992).
124. BREAU, supra note 59, at 85. Professor Breau notes that the Organization of
African Unity also supported ECOWAS's humanitarian intervention, even going so far as
to provide financial assistance, and that Western states, including the United States,
Great Britain, and the European Union, also supported the action by contributing
financial assistance. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 103. Throughout this time, there were several instances of ECOMOG and
British involvement at the request of the existing government. The intervention that this
study focuses on, however, is the ECOWAS intervention of February 1998, which again
occurred independently of Security Council authorization, and was conducted without
consent for the purpose of bringing the humanitarian disaster to an end.
126. Id.
127. STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE
RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 93 (1999).
128. EARL CONTEH-MORGAN & MAC DIXON-FYLE, SIERRA LEONE AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 128-29 (1999).
129. BREAU, supra note 59, at 103.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 104.
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States issued similar reports of torture, rape, and sexual slavery, 132 and
Amnesty International reported that 250,000 Sierra Leonean refugees
had fled to Guinea and Liberia. 133 M6decins Sans Frontiares also
released reports that armed groups in Sierra Leone were "implementing
a policy of terror against civilians."134 Widespread atrocity crimes were
unquestionable.
Heeding these warnings, ECOWAS again took action. And
following a May 1997 coup, the organization convened and issued a
final communiqu6, urging: "that no State recognize the regime installed
following the coup of May 25, 1997, and that every effort be made to
restore the lawful government by a combination of three measures, i.e.:
the use of dialogue; the application of sanctions, including an embargo;
and the use of force."135 But despite continued pressure, by the end of
1997 it was apparent that the rebel groups were not disarming and the
diplomatic peace efforts were not succeeding.136  ECOWAS thus
reconvened and issued the final communiqu6, once again specifically
referencing "the use of force."1 37 In early 1998, ECOMOG engaged in
both bombing campaigns and ground operations.138 The SC had not
authorized the forceful actions.139
The ECOWAS communiqu6s set forth the justifications for its
actions. The organization referred to the "bloodshed and other loss of
human life," the increase of refugees in other neighboring countries,
and the threat to peace and security in the region.140 In similar fashion
to intervention in Liberia, the actions were justified by humanitarian
132. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT ON HUmAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/US-
013098.html.
133. BREAU, supra note 59, at 105.
134. Id.
135. ECOWAS Foreign Ministers Committee of Four, Final Communiqud, 1 9 (June
26, 1997), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/ECOWAS-062697.html;
see also Permanent Rep. of Nigeria to the U.N., Letter dated 27 June 1997 from the
Permanent Rep. of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1997/499 (June 27, 1997) (emphasis added).
136. Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 321, 328-29 (1998).
137. ECOWAS Foreign Ministers Committee of Five, Final Communiqud, 6 (Feb. 5-
6, 1998), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/ECOWAS-020698.html.
138. BREAU, supra note 59, at 108.
139. See S.C. Res 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) The Resolution did not
authorize force, but stated the Council was "gravely concerned" at the . . deteriorating
humanitarian conditions" in Sierra Leone, and reiterating that the SC had "determined"
that the situation constituted a "threat to international peace and security in the region."
Id.
140. BREAU, supra note 59, at 111. Notably, ECOWAS also referred to restoring the
democratically elected government of Kabbah, self-defense of the ECOMOG troops, and
humanitarian disaster. Id.
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necessity. And like the previously mentioned interventions, the
international community responded with approval. In the debates
surrounding SC Resolution 1132, the participating states praised
ECOWAS's continued attempts to halt the conflict.14 The President of
the SC similarly praised ECOWAS,142 and the UN Secretary-General
applauded the diplomacy of ECOWAS and the contributions made by
ECOMOG officers in removing the military junta.143 The SC even took
the extra step and passed multiple resolutions once again
"commending" both ECOWAS and ECOMOG for their intervention into
Sierra Leone.144 For the third time in less than a decade, there was
patent support for independent humanitarian intervention.
Kosovo 1999
Clearly the most important precedent for independent HI is
NATO's intervention into Kosovo in 1999. Not only was the
intervention followed by the clearest claims of humanitarian
intervention as a legal right,145 but it also received near universal
reaction from states, as well as innumerable commentaries from
international lawyers.146 The foremost justification by NATO was that
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) authorities were carrying out
massacres, grave breaches of human rights, mass expulsions of a
particular ethnic group (ethnic cleansing), and that the humanitarian
catastrophe constituted a threat to peace and security.147  It thus
claimed that its intervention was "necessary" to prevent the
humanitarian catastrophe. The situation prompted apt consideration of
the question: "Should one remain silent and inactive only because the
existing body of international law proves incapable of remedying such a
situation? Or, rather, should respect for the Rule of Law be sacrificed
on the altar of human compassion?"148 Perhaps the two options are not
so exclusive.
141. U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3822d mtg. passim, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3822 (Oct. 8, 1997).
142. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. SIPRST/1998/5 (Feb. 26, 1998).
143. U.N. Secretary-General, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in Sierra Leone, 38, U.N. Doc. S/1998/249 (Mar. 18, 1998).
144. S.C. Res. 1289, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000); S.C. Res 1270, T 7, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999); S.C. Res. 1162, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (Apr. 17,
1998).
145. See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Oral
Pleadings II, at 6 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
105/4515.pdf.
146. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 28, at 28-29.
147. Id. at 25; see U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. passim, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988
(Mar. 24, 1999).
148. Cassese, supra note 28, at 25.
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The conflict in Kosovo stemmed from Slobodan Milosevic's refusal
to recognize Kosovo as autonomous. 149 The refusal led to increased
tensions in the region, and reports of violence against the civilian
population began to surface as early as 1990. 150 For the next several
years, hostilities continued to escalate, accompanied by numerous
reports of discriminatory mistreatment, arbitrary detention, forced
disappearances, and torture. 151 In 1998, full scale armed conflict was
underway.152 And on October 3, 1998, the UN Secretary-General issued
a report to the SC describing the targeting and mass killing of civilians
in Kosovo, comparing them to the atrocities seen earlier in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which included the Srebrenica genocide and other
instances of massive ethnic cleansing. 1 53
On October 9, 1998, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
proclaimed "the danger of a humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo
"loomed large." 154 He contended that "a brutal campaign of forced
deportation, torture and murder" plagued the region, and that the
humanitarian catastrophe was evidence that the threat was spreading
and intensifying.15 5 This contention was supported by a myriad of other
reports by international organizations operating in the area. 156 The SC,
through Resolution 1199, even expressed grave concern at the fighting
in Kosovo "and in particular the excessive indiscriminate use of force by
Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in
numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the [UN]
Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their
homes." 57 The full extent of the situation finally caught the attention of
the international community by early 1999, and the atrocities in Kosovo
were deemed ethnic cleansing.' 5 8
149. See BREAU, supra note 59, at 120; KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 37725-26
(Vol. 36, Sept. 1990).
150. KEESING, supra note 149, at 37725-26.
151. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared
Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council,
T 34, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1068 (Nov. 12, 1998).
152. TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
LESSONS FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN
Kosovo 5 (2006).
153. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to
Resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) of the Security Council, 9, U.N. Doc.
S/1998/912 (Oct. 3, 1998).
154. Cassese, supra note 28, at 28; see also Simma, supra note 19, at 7.
155. Cassese, supra note 28, at 28.
156. Id.
157. S.C. Res. 1199, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); see also S.C. Res.
1203, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1160, at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998).
158. BREAU, supra note 59, at 125.
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By the time NATO intervened in March of 1999, peaceful means of
settling the conflict had been exhausted.159 Multiple meetings had been
called,160 the SC had imposed arms embargos,161 various international
diplomats visited Belgrade,162 and multiple peace talks were held in the
region. 163 A verification mission was also attempted under the
authorization of the UN to allow NATO flights over the Kosovo
region. 164 However, all efforts failed, and the cease-fire collapsed by
early 1999. NATO made further efforts at negotiation at Rambouillet,
but Milosevic failed to agree to international terms for protecting
Kosovo civilians, stating "he would rather face air-strikes than a
peacekeeping force."165 In response, because the SC was unable to take
decisive action, NATO commenced the most publicized independent
humanitarian intervention to date, and bombing began on March 24,
1999.166
At the time of the intervention, the international community
responded with tacit approval. In the words of Antonio Cassese, no
state or group of states took the action "that would have been obvious"
in the presence of significant disapproval: to bring the matter before the
General Assembly. 167 Regional organizations seemed content with the
intervention, convening no official sessions, and, the SC likewise called
no emergency meeting to order. In fact, when given the opportunity to
unequivocally condemn NATO's intervention, the SC refused, defeating
(by a vote of 12 to 3) a Draft Resolution put forth to denounce NATO for
violating Articles 2(4), 24, and 53 of the UN Charter.168 By voting
against the resolution, the SC tacitly pronounced that the
circumstances of NATO's intervention did not violate those provisions,
effectively endorsing HI. A contrary conclusion would entail a finding
that the SC itself acted contrary to its responsibilities under the
159. Cassese, supra note 28, at 28.
160. S.C. Res. 1160, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (noting that the OSCE
met on March 11, 1998, to condemn Serb actions); Permanent Rep. of Bulg. to the U.N.,
Letter dated 13 March 1998 from the Permanent Rep. of Bulg. to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/234 (Mar. 13, 1998) (issuing a joint
declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries of south-eastern Europe for
Serbian authorities to find a solution to the conflict).
161. S.C. Res. 1199, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1160, 8,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 23, 1998).
162. BREAU, supra note 59, at 127.
163. Id.
164. S.C. Res. 1203, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998).
165. BREAU, supra note 59, at 131.
166. Id. at 132.
167. Cassese, supra note 28, at 29.
168. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999);
see also S.C. Draft Res. 328, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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Charter.169  Going even further, SC Resolution 1244, which
subsequently authorized force under UN auspices, contained no
criticism whatsoever of NATO's use of force, not even implicitly.170
Not only did states tacitly approve of NATO's intervention, but
many actually took the extra step and openly supported the action. For
example, while attending the emergency SC session, Albania and
Bosnia-Herzegovina explicitly commended NATO's action. 171  The
European Union also sent a communication to the Secretary-General
endorsing the NATO intervention.17 2  Both responses showed that
Europe, the continent most affected by the tragedy, supported the
intervention. Beyond Europe, states as diverse as the members of the
Organization of Islamic States publically supported the action,
expressing "regret" that the SC failed to uphold its primary
responsibility under the Charter.17 3 The only states explicitly speaking
out against the intervention at the time included the FRY, Russia,
China, Cuba, Belarus, Ukraine, Namibia, India, and, ambiguously,
Mexico.' 74
Equally, if not more, important to the discussion on custom are the
justifications put forth by the acting states themselves. Subsequent to
the intervention, NATO states invoked HI as their sole justification,
referencing it both explicitly and implicitly as a legal doctrine. For
example, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands explicitly
stated at the SC Emergency Session for Kosovo that NATO's action was
legal.175 Belgium also invoked "humanitarian intervention" before the
ICJ in Legality of the Use of Force.176 The United States, Germany,
Canada, and France similarly responded, referring to NATO's action as
"justified and necessary to stop the violence and prevent an even greater
humanitarian disaster." 77 NATO's 19 members echoed this position
169. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2; Alain Pellet, State Sovereignty and the Protection of
Fundamental Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 1 PUGWASH OCCASIONAL
PAPERS 37, 42 (2000); Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comment: NATO's Kosovo Intervention,
NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 830 (1999).
170. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); Cassese, supra note 4, at
792.
171. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999).
172. BREAU, supra note 59, at 143-44.
173. Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Rep. of Iran to the United Nations, Letter dated 31
Mar. 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the president of the Sec. Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/1999/363
(Mar. 31, 1999) [hereinafter OIS Letter].
174. Cassese, supra note 4, at 792.
175. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 8, 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24,
1999).
176. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 34 (May 10,
1999).
177. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 4, 5, 8, 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24,
1999); BREAU, supra note 59, at 137 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K.
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through NATO's official justification of "avert[ing] a humanitarian
catastrophe." 178 NATO had previously gone even further and codified
HI in its Parliamentary Assembly. 179 In sum, the justifications of
NATO states and the international community demonstrate a strong
opinio juris in favor of this proposition: in situations of extreme
necessity, where the SC fails to uphold its primary responsibility to
maintain peace and security, states may be justified in undertaking
"independent" humanitarian intervention.
EVALUATING OPINIO JURIS: CONTEMPORANEOUS STATE ACTION SPEAKS
LOUDER THAN SUBSEQUENT DIPLOMATIC DEFLECTION
In the wake of Kosovo's intervention, the international community
engaged in substantial dialogue over the legitimacy of NATO's action,
as well as the doctrine of humanitarian intervention itself. This
dialogue has continued to date, pitting many states and many of
international law's most highly qualified publicists on opposite sides of
the fence: some claim that independent HI can be lawful in extreme
circumstances180 while others claim that independent HI is always
manifestly unlawful. 181 Others delicately scale the fence, arguing that
HI is legitimate, but not yet lawful.18 2 No matter the conclusion,
discerning opinio juris has always proved perplexing to international
lawyers studying humanitarian intervention. This is the result of often
conflicting state actions and official statements, incompatible acts and
statements across time, ambiguous acts of diplomacy, and, in some
instances, an inconclusive absence of action and/or comment altogether.
This creates an extremely arduous process.
To illustrate: as shown above there is significant opinio juris
favoring independent HI, especially on behalf of acting states.
Nevertheless, numerous states have subsequently, and explicitly,
rejected a "right" to HI. Most notably is the joint statement of the
Group of 77 (G77), which proclaims to reject "the so-called 'right' to
humanitarian intervention . . . ... 183 Assuming that this statement
Albright); PHILIP E. AUERSWALD, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
THROUGH DOCUMENTS 735-36 (2000).
178. Press Release, Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, Press Statement by
Dr. Javier Solana (Mar. 23, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/doculpr/1999/p99-
040e.htm.
179. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Recasting Euro-Atlantic
Security: NATO's Nineteen Nations-OSCE, 28 (Nov. 1998), available at www.nato-
pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1998/ar290peter-e.asp.
180. See, e.g., TES)N, supra note 20, at 6; Nanda et al., supra note 4, at 866-67;
Reisman, supra note 20, at 861; Rogers, supra note 4, at 735.
181. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 12, at 100; Simma, supra note 19, at 2-3.
182. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 59, at 226; Cassese, supra note 28, at 25.
183. Group of 77, Declaration of the South Summit, 54 (Apr. 10-14, 2000), http://
www.g77.org/summit/DeclarationG77Summit.htm.
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represents the position of all G77 Member States, this evidences the
stance of approximately 130 states.184 Out of the approximate 200
states that make up the international community, this is at least a two-
thirds majority. Thus, the natural reaction may be to conclude that
even if the remaining states demonstrate the belief that HI is lawful, it
would be insufficient to overcome this majority and form a customary
norm. Note, however, that the ICJ has explicitly held that "the mere
fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not
sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary
international law, and as applicable as such to those states."185 In other
words, one must look beyond these declarations and evaluate state
action.
There is a marked difference between this pronouncement made at
the 2000 South Summit and the practice of G77 members when actually
faced with humanitarian atrocities. In fact, practice among these
states, coupled with their legal statements at the times of intervention,
seem rather to affirm some form of HI instead of rejecting it outright.
For example, while sitting on the SC, six states from G77 endorsed the
right of HI by voting against the Draft Resolution to halt NATO
intervention - in effect, they voted in favor of NATO action (Argentina,
Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, and Malaysia).186 Similarly, the 15
members of ECOWAS,187 all of which are members of the G77,188 have
each resorted to HI themselves, as shown above, justifying their actions
on humanitarian grounds. Additionally, the African Union (AU), whose
53 members also all belong to the G77, has not only endorsed HI, but
has codified independent HI in its Charter without any mention of need
for SC authorization.189 Furthermore, subsequent to NATO's forceful
intervention, the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group
on Kosovo issued a statement to the SC stating: "in view of the failure
of all diplomatic efforts, due to the intransigence of the Belgrade
authorities, a decisive international action was necessary to prevent
humanitarian catastrophe and further violations of human rights in
Kosovo." 190 Presupposing that this statement reflected the views of the
Organization of Islamic Conference at the time, which seems reasonable
184. Member States, GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html.
185. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 184 (June 27).
186. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. SIPV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999).
187. Member States, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS),
http://www.ecowas.int/ (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo).
188. Member States, GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html.
189. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, para. h (entered into force July 11,
2000).
190. OIS Letter, supra note 173, at 2 (emphasis added).
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based on the lack of objection to the letter, this represents another 29
states, not counting the 28 that are also members of the AU. 191
Therefore, what "right" the G77 states are actually rejecting is
unclear because at the time of these interventions, the large majority of
these states responded with both active and passive acceptance. 192
These responses speak much louder than subsequent diplomatic
proclamations purporting to reject humanitarian intervention. If these
states truly believed that humanitarian action was manifestly
unlawful, they should have, and likely would have, spoken out against
the action as it was occurring. To provide comparison, in other
situations of aggression, such as when Iraq invaded Kuwait, states have
been quick to complain and call on the SC and UN for action. 193
Moreover, the SC itself has been willing to condemn the inappropriate
use of force swiftly and unambiguously, such as when Uganda invaded
the Democratic Republic of Congo for reasons clearly not amounting to
HI. 194 Finally, when given the opportunity to address the situation in
its totality at the World Summit in 2005, the GA accepted the
"Responsibility to Protect," and refused to unequivocally declare that
independent HI outside of the SC was never allowed. 195 This would
have been the ideal forum in which to make such a proclamation; and
an absence of such a pronouncement speaks loudly to the
impracticability of proclaiming that independent humanitarian
intervention is never acceptable.
So how should these inconsistencies be evaluated? Ultimately,
when adding the actions and statements of various individual states, as
well as the NATO states and EU states, a total of at least 119 states
have supported independent HI is some form or another. 196 And they
191. Member States, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, http://www.oic-oci.
org/member-states.asp.
192. See Declaration of the South Summit, supra note 183.
193. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1229 (5th ed.
2009) (noting the U.N. Security Council's passing of Resolution 660 to condemn the
invasion, and Resolution 661 to place economic sanctions on Iraq); Gulf War, NEW WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gulf War
?oldid=680059 ("Kuwaiti and U.S. delegations requested a meeting of the U.N. Security
Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a
withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August the Arab League passed its own resolution. The
resolution called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against
outside intervention. On 6 August U.N. Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on
Iraq.").
194. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Cong. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
116, 1 154 (Dec. 19); S.C. Res. 1304, T 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1304 (June 16, 2000) (noting
the "violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo").
195. See World Summit, supra note 5, 138-39.
196. 28 NATO States, 53 African Union States, 28 OIS states (which are not also AU
members), Venezuela, Russia (which has claimed R2P in Georgia), Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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have done so while the situation was unfolding. Obviously, official
diplomatic statements attempting to clarify states' positions on an issue
cannot be ignored when determining whether a state is acting out of a
sense of legal obligation (the requirement for opinio juris). However, to
more clearly flush out the true motives of the acting states, state
practice must be evaluated concurrently with opinio juris. Doing so
more accurately evidences what states really believe is acceptable
under international law. It is all too easy to support an action (or
acquiesce to that action) while it is occurring, and later purport to reject
a similar action likely for fear that any ensuing doctrine would be
abused. However, the possibility of abuse does not mean that action is
unlawful when done correctly. Rather, abusive situations are unlawful;
non-abusive situations are lawful. Self-defense, for example, has been
abused countless times. This has not caused states to claim the right
no longer exists. The same can be said for true humanitarian
intervention.
Even without distinguishing the true actions of "objecting" states to
this extent before, numerous authors have concluded that a customary
right to HI exists. 197  This analysis should serve to bolster their
contentions. Consequently, if brought before the ICJ, states have a
good faith argument that a "right" to independent humanitarian
intervention exists.
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
While there is a good-faith argument that a "right" to independent
humanitarian intervention exists akin to the "right" of self-defense,
there is yet another viable argument available to states enacting true
humanitarian interventions. In the wake of Kosovo, distinguished
international jurists Antonio Cassese and Thomas Franck both came to
the conclusion that HI is not yet legal, but justified.198 The "justified"
conclusion may seem paradoxical at first, raising the question: if HI is
justified, then how would it serve international justice to find the
particular justified intervention unlawful if a country were brought
before the ICJ? In reality, such an outcome would not serve
international justice. Nevertheless, without explicitly posing a possible
remedy, the conclusion of these venerated jurists inadvertently hints at
a viable defense: the state of necessity ("necessity").
Albania, and the 6 states supporting NATO action on the Security Council (Argentina,
Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, and Malaysia).
197. See, e.g., FERNANDO TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY 418 (3rd ed. 2005); Greenwood, supra note 59, at 931; Nanda, et al., supra
note 4, at 862-65; Reisman, supra note 20, at 860; Rogers, supra note 4, at 732.
198. Cassese, supra note 28, at 24-25; Franck, supra note 3, at 859.
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Necessity, which is only available in extremely rare situations,
precludes the wrongfulness of state actions that are otherwise
considered technically illegal. 199 The doctrine can be paralleled to
domestic processes that excuse illegal behaviors, despite the lack of an
established and defined defense like duress, self-defense, or insanity.
For example, states almost always allow certain classes of persons to
escape legal liability when acting for the greater good of society, such as
a fire fighter who must destroy personal property to prevent a fire from
spreading, or a police officer who is forced to trespass on private
property to apprehend an armed criminal. Lay citizens can similarly be
exonerated for their illegal acts if necessary to prevent a greater harm,
such as a child stealing a bicycle to escape from a kidnapper, or a
person running a stop sign to get a dying spouse to the hospital. Most
times these defenses are not explicitly defined in statutes, but are
rather applied by judicial bodies in the interests of upholding a clear
means to justice. The notable commonality, as with HI, is the belief
that the unlawful action is necessary to prevent greater harm.
Although "necessity" is not a rule of law strictly speaking, the
doctrine has a long history of acceptance in international law. 2 0 0 It has
been implemented by numerous international tribunals, and also
employed by the ICJ on several occasions, 201 with each coming to the
conclusion that the doctrine holds a central place in international
jurisprudence and can serve to justify otherwise unlawful actions. The
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (DASR) describe the current
customary version of necessity, 2 0 2 demonstrating that necessity does not
invalidate the international obligation concerned; "rather [it] provide[s]
a justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in
question subsists." 203
To escape wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal action, three criteria
must be fulfilled. First, the act must be "the only way for the State to
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril." 2 0 4
With HI, it is fairly simple to conclude that in some circumstances the
use of force will be the only way to stop genocide, ethnic cleansing, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity - the prevention of which is
199. DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80; Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 50 (Sept. 25).
200. E.g., DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80; Legal Consequences of Construction of
Wall in Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, T 140 (July 9);
Gabdikovo, 1997 I.C.J. T 51.
201. See Amin George Forji, Drawing the Right Lessons from ICSID Jurisprudence on
the Doctrine of Necessity, 76 ARBITRATION 44, 49 (2010) (discussing doctrine of necessity's
use in arbitration decisions presented to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes).
202. DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80.
203. Id. 2, at 71.
204. Id. art. 25, at 80.
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unquestionably an essential interest of the international community. 205
Second, the state must not have contributed to the situation of
necessity. 206 This would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
but it is clearly conceivable that this element will also usually be
fulfilled in a true humanitarian intervention. Finally, the act must "not
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole." 207 The third element is the most problematic and thus deserves
further analysis.
The two international interests most impacted by HI are state
sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force. Both are without
question among the most "essential" interests of all states. However, as
illustrated above, when states fail to protect their own populations from
genocide and other atrocity crimes, they forfeit a part of their
sovereignty and lose the protection of the principle of non-intervention.
Thus, in the case of atrocity crimes, "sovereignty" does not preclude the
necessity doctrine.
The interplay between the necessity doctrine and the use of force is
a more complex situation. In the commentary to the DASR, the
International Law Commission (ILC) contends, "the plea of necessity is
not intended to cover conduct which is in principle regulated by the
primary obligations," using the rules relating to the use of force as a
possible example. 208 Therefore, at first glance necessity could appear
inapplicable to HI. However, when the DASR was drafted, the authors
also specifically addressed the possible applicability of necessity to HI
and were unable to determine whether a state of necessity could be
applicable or not.209 The conclusion at the time was that "the question
of whether measures of forcible humanitarian intervention . . . may be
lawful under modern international law is not covered by article 25."210
In other words, the authors of the DASR did not conclude either way
whether the doctrine of necessity is applicable to HI.
The greatest obstacle to overcome for necessity to work with HI is
the pronouncement of the ICJ that necessity may not be invoked "if the
international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international
205. Id. 19, at 84; see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. A/760, Annex, art. 8 (Dec. 3, 1948) (adopted by G.A. Res.
260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948)). For a plea of necessity, the
contribution must be to "sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral."
DASR, supra note 78, 20 at 84; see also Gabeikovo, 1997 I.C.J. 51-52.
206. DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80.
207. Id.
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law." 2 1 1 This poses a problem because the prohibition on the use of
force is commonly referred to as a peremptory or jus cogens norm.
However, it is important to note that there is no consensus among
international jurists (or states) as to the scope of the prohibition. 212 In
fact, distinguished publicists have concluded that even accepting the
undefined proposition that the non-use-of-force is jus cogens, even
characterization as jus cogens does not prohibit international evolution
of the norm's contours. 213 Thus, it is conceivable that exceptions to the
non-use-of-force principle could evolve through custom.
Consequently, if any prohibition on the use of force has attained
definable jus cogens status, it would be appropriately categorized as the
prohibition on the "aggressive" use of force. 214 And as HI is no longer
considered aggression, it is not precluded by jus cogens. A contrary
finding would mean that when acting through Uniting for Peace, the
international community - through the General Assembly - violated
this very peremptory norm. Going further, HI is aimed at halting
atrocity crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity.
These are also considered peremptory norms of international law, thus
pitting two peremptory norms against each other. If a state is violating
its erga omnes obligations by committing atrocity crimes, that state
would logically be precluded (by the unclean hands doctrine, for
example) from claiming that a state cannot use force against it to halt
these atrocities.
In any case, despite the DASR's avoidance of the doctrine's
applicability to HI, because the doctrine of necessity is also a customary
norm,215 its permissible uses as a norm of procedure can also evolve just
as substantive customary norms. Put another way, if there is
widespread belief on the part of states that HI is warranted by
"necessity" in certain circumstances, the doctrine can evolve to cover
this area of international law as well, notwithstanding its association
with the use of force. Consequently, whereas there is sufficient
evidence to find HI lawful (as demonstrated above), there is even
greater evidence showing that HI is accepted as legitimate and
"necessary" in certain extreme circumstances. In fact, HI is accepted to
such a degree that states are willing to accept humanitarian
211. Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 50 (Sept. 25).
212. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 29 (2d ed. 2004).
213. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifteenth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 9, art. 37, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963),
reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 187, 198-99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/163; IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 (6th ed. 2003).
214. See, e.g., BREAU, supra note 59, at 256; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
215. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 1 140 (July 9).
VOL. 40:1-3198
STATES DEFENDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
intervention without condemnation. 2 16 Therefore, it can reasonably be
argued that in such circumstances the legal wrongfulness of HI should
also be precluded, even if a court were to find that no "right" to
independent HI exists.
A close examination of an extreme situation demonstrates why
such an argument is desirable. In some situations, the only thing
standing between preventing genocide and standing idly by while a
Rwanda-type situation unfolds is the unwillingness of a P5 member to
give its vote. Following the absolutist argument, then, it is conceivable
that there could be a circumstance in which 191 members of the UN
were in favor of intervention, but because China, for example, vetoed
action, it would be automatically illegal. And upon this finding of
illegality, the intervening states, even if made up of these 191 nations,
could be held liable before the ICJ. This result is obviously absurd and
would be contrary to the very idea of state-developed international law.
Admittedly, such a clear-cut circumstance will never come to fruition.
However, what occurred in the above interventions is not far off-
Security Council action was blocked by virtue of the veto, or threat of
the veto, and with substantial international support, states acted to
uphold the responsibility that the SC failed to uphold. Necessarily
then, there is a gray area that allows for the use of this justification,
even if only on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, the true problem is discerning whether a particular
intervention is legal or justified under the circumstances, not whether
all interventions are per se lawful or unlawful.
WHEN IS INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION EXCUSABLE?
In sum, there are essentially two arguments available to states
that muster the political will to intervene for humanitarian purposes: a
customary "right" to humanitarian intervention or the "necessity" to put
a stop to atrocity crimes, which precludes the wrongfulness of the act.
But are they really different? The distinction is somewhat trivial on a
practical level. Clearly, the two methods vary legally: one accepts as
lawful a certain action (an exception); and the other merely precludes
the wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal action (a justification).
However, with regard to their application to independent HI, they are
essentially the same: (1) the outcome is the same (i.e., a state will or
will not be held legally liable under the doctrine of state responsibility);
(2) the process is the same (i.e., allowable use has emerged through
custom,); and, more importantly, (3) the method of reaching the
216. See supra Section 4; see also, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 126 (1991); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian
Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999); Franck, supra note 3, at 858-59; Byers &
Chesterman, supra note 2, at 177.
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outcome is also the same (i.e., the same universally-accepted elements
for a true humanitarian intervention must be fulfilled, as discussed
below).
Despite considerable controversy over whether humanitarian
intervention is ever acceptable, there has been near universal
agreement on the necessary elements for legitimate intervention if it
were to take place. 217 They can be summed up in six categories. First,
the purpose must be to prevent mass atrocities, including genocide,
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and rampant war crimes,
which the local government is either committing or unable to stop.
Second, the SC must be unable to uphold its responsibility to maintain
peace and security because of the use or threat of the veto by one of its
permanent members. Third, intervention must be necessary (i.e., all
reasonable peaceful means have been exhausted). Fourth, the action
must be proportionate (the use of force must truly be for humanitarian
purposes and limited in extent and scope stopping those atrocities).
Fifth, the HI must not be opposed by a majority of states. Finally, the
intervention must not pose a greater threat to international peace and
security than the atrocities that it is meant to stop. There is little, if
any, controversy over these elements. 218
The real issue is with timing. Whether it is appropriate to find an
intervention legal or justified requires a case-by-case determination. 2 19
In particular, special attention must be given to whether intervention
would cause (or has caused) greater tensions throughout the world,
thereby threatening international peace and security. Remember, the
underlying rationale for humanitarian intervention in the first place is
the protection of human life. If intervention threatens even greater loss
of life by creating a world war, for example, it would obviously not be
desirable, lawful, or justified. Likewise, if an intervention is not
proportionate and causes greater destruction than it was alleged to
prevent, it will also not be justified. Additionally, the action must be
both necessary and widely supported by the international community.
All of these elements must be sufficiently fulfilled to fall under
either the exception of HI or the doctrine of necessity. However, it is not
possible to fully assess these elements prior to intervention. Thus, in
most cases it will be a necessary evil to fully judge the justifiability of
humanitarian intervention only after the fact. This invariably poses a
problematic risk for states considering independent humanitarian
217. R2P, supra note 5, at 32-37.
218. See, e.g., Statement by the Rep. of the U.K., U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg.
at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999); R2P, supra note 5, at 32-37; Cassese,
supra note 28, at 27. This consensus has emerged through the valuable work of several
independent commissions acting at the bequest of the General Assembly and other
regional organizations. See, e.g., R2P, supra note 5.
219. E.g., World Summit, supra note 5, T 139.
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intervention, but such is the reality of one of the most difficult doctrines
in international law. Nonetheless, difficulty does not proscribe legality.
And when discussing legal liability, determining whether a state acted
consistently with its international obligations is always an after-the-
fact analysis anyway. The question analyzed herein is not whether
states should intervene, but whether the ICJ could conceivably excuse a
state if one day it did act to put an end to atrocity crimes. The answer
is yes.
LOOKING FORWARD
If a state is brought before the ICJ and alleges HI as a defense, how
the court rules is of no small consequence. In fact, the rationale relied
upon could very well put the entire international community in the
position of having to choose between (1) taking action and testing the
scope of the non-use-of-force principle or (2) remaining inactive and
risking violation of its responsibility to protect targeted civilian
populations. The reason for this stems from prior ICJ jurisprudence.
In the 2007 Genocide opinion, the ICJ recognized that all states
have a legal obligation to take action to prevent genocide. 220 This
obligation arises from Article 1 of the Genocide Convention 221 - a norm
also widely recognized as custom. 2 22 In short, the Court held that the
obligation of states to prevent genocide is both "normative and
compelling," extending beyond the responsibilities of the competent UN
organs:
Even if and when these organs have been called upon, this
does not mean that the States parties to the Convention
are relieved of the obligation to take such action as they
can to prevent genocide from occurring, while respecting
the United Nations Charter and any decisions that may
have been taken by its competent organs. 223
Accordingly, states are instructed that they have an obligation to
employ "all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent
genocide so far as possible." 224  When a state does not take "all
measures . . . within its power," then it incurs legal responsibility. 225
The Court addresses several considerations when determining whether
a state should be responsible for failure to prevent genocide - namely
capacity to influence the situation, political links to those responsible
220. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 427 (Feb. 26).
221. See id. T 426.
222. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 721, 744
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
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for genocide, and geographical proximity to the events. However, the
Court also explicitly notes that the required action must be "within the
limits permitted by international law."2 2 6
This brings this discussion to the crux of the matter. In Genocide,
the Court did not address whether outside states could (or should) use
force to protect civilian populations. Indeed, in that case it would have
been improper for the Court to do so. But if the Court were to someday
rule that there is a "right" to humanitarian intervention, this
pronouncement could instantly transform the R2P from an aspirational
doctrine to one potentially requiring forceful actions (at least in regards
to preventing genocide). In other words, because the prohibition on the
use of force is the only norm preventing states from taking forceful
action in the face of genocide, once a right to use force for HI is
recognized, nothing proscribes states from using forceful measures.
And if there is no legal proscription on the action, states could
conceivably be held responsible for not taking "all measures within
their power" to prevent genocide (and possibly other atrocity crimes), 227
including force.
Creating such a legal requirement would admittedly be extremely
confounding. Evaluating issues such as whether using force was
actually within a state's capacity, 2 2 8 whether all states could be
simultaneously held liable for the same failure, and whether states with
greater military capacity or in closer proximity are more liable for the
failure would be exceedingly arduous. Nevertheless, avoiding this legal
predicament is something the ICJ will have to consider when in fact it
is called upon to answer the controversial question of whether
independent HI is ever acceptable in modern international law. In this
vein, because the international community has demonstrated
acceptance of independent HI in rare circumstances, perhaps relying on
the necessity doctrine would be the Court's more prescient option.
226. Id.
227. While the ICJ decision clearly only refers to and applies to genocide as such, the
movement in the international community is towards equating atrocity crimes such as
ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity with genocide - with all
necessitating the same responsibility to protect. Therefore, depending on the change in
custom with regard to these norms, the responsibility to prevent could also conceivably be
applicable to these crimes as well.
228. It should be noted, however, that ability to succeed is not an allowable excuse -
at least under the current rationale of the Genocide opinion. The Court held: "As
indicated above, for a State to be held responsible for breaching its obligation of
prevention, it does not need to be proven that the State concerned definitely had the
power to prevent the genocide; it is sufficient that it had the means to do so and that it
manifestly refrained from using them." Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. T 438.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the evolution of humanitarian intervention provides
states with two viable defenses if brought before the International
Court of Justice: (1) the right to humanitarian intervention and (2) the
doctrine of necessity. Because of the marked incongruities in states'
responses to HI, discerning the outcome of this evolution is not easy.
Nevertheless, by giving due weight to the contemporaneous statements
and actions (or inactions) of states at the time interventions have taken
place, rather than being misled by subsequent diplomatic statements
aimed at discouraging abuse of the independent HI doctrine, it is
possible to recognize an opinio juris of states that HI is lawful (or at
least legally justified) when truly taken for humanitarian reasons, when
conducted proportionately to that purpose, and when international
peace is not put in greater peril because of the intervention.
The tension between sovereignty, permissible uses of force, and the
prevention of atrocity crimes is unavoidable. Even so, this evolution
towards independent humanitarian intervention was somewhat
inevitable considering the world's foremost priority of protecting human
life. In fact, the evolution was prophesized at the time of the Charter's
inception by the likes of former ICJ judge Philip C. Jessup. Judge
Jessup concluded that if the SC were unable "to act with the speed
requisite to preserve life," individual states would be justified to act in
lieu of the ineffective "collective measures under the [SC]."229 Indeed,
prior to the inception of the UN Charter, the international community
openly accepted independent HI.2 30 However, upon establishment of
the Charter, states resolved to refrain from the use of force, 231 and to
take collective action - through the UN - to maintain international
peace and security. 232 Notably, states never rejected the idea of HI per
se. Instead, they agreed to the terms of the Charter, believing that the
SC would guide the collective actions of Member States and act "on
their behalf."233 When this ideal failed to materialize, independent HI
reemerged.
Whether states take the next logical step and realize the connection
between this "right" and their "responsibility" to protect beleaguered
populations from atrocity crimes is yet to be seen. As it has always
been, the biggest obstacle to the prevention of mass atrocities is the not
the existence of non-permissive legal doctrines - it is the lack of
political will.
229. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 170 (1948).
230. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338
(1963).
231. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
232. Id. art. 42.
233. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
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